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Abstract
Anticipatory thinking is a complex cognitive process for assessing and managing risk in many con-
texts. Humans use anticipatory thinking to identify potential future issues and proactively take
actions to manage their risks. In this paper we define a cognitive systems approach to anticipatory
thinking as a metacognitive goal reasoning mechanism. The contributions of this paper include (1)
defining anticipatory thinking in the MIDCA cognitive architecture, (2) operationalizing anticipa-
tory thinking as a three step process for managing risk in plans, and (3) a numeric risk assessment
calculating an expected cost-benefit ratio for modifying a plan with anticipatory actions.
1. Introduction
Anticipatory Thinking (AT) is the deliberate and divergent analysis of relevant future states that is
a critical skill in medical, military, and intelligence analysis (Geden et al., 2018). It differs from
predicting a single correct outcome in that its goal is to identify key indicators or threatening condi-
tions so one might proactively mitigate and intervene at critical points to avoid catastrophic failure.
This uniquely human ability allows us to learn, and act, without actually experiencing. AI systems
with this robust capability would support the autonomy and contextual reasoning needed for next
generation AI.
However, AI systems have yet to adopt this capability. While agents with a metacognitive archi-
tecture can formulate their own goals or adapt their plans in response to their environment (e.g. Cox
(2016)) and learning-driven goal generation anticipates new goals from past examples (Pozanco
et al., 2018), they do not reason prospectively about how their current goals could potentially fail
or become attainable. Expectations have a similar limitation, they represent an agent’s mental view
of future states and are useful for diagnosing plan failure and discrepancies in execution (Muñoz
et al., 2019) but do not critically examine a plan or goal for potential weaknesses or opportunities
in advance. To ensure that maintenance goals do not fail, proactive maintenance goals are achieved
with plans that do not non-conflict with existing achievement goals, a similar goal to anticipatory
thinking, but require an explicit knowledge representation in the domain (Duff et al., 2006) and
is more akin to prediction than anticipation. At present, agents do not analyze plans and goals to
reveal their unnamed risks (e.g. such as actions of another agent) and how they might be proac-
tively mitigated to avoid execution failures. Calls to the AI community to investigate imagination
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machines (Mahadevan, 2018) highlights the limitations between current data-driven advances in AI
and matching human performance in the long term.
To address this limitation, we take a step towards imagination machines with a contribution that
operationalizes the concept of anticipatory thinking, a cognitive process reliant on an ample supply
of imagination, as a metacognitive capability. We propose this capability as a kind of solution
formulation method, a post-planning step that analyzes a solution plan for potential weaknesses and
modifies the solution plan to account for them. This approach is in contrast to problem formulation,
a pre-planning step that analyzes a problem for efficient search strategies, as well as online risk-
aware planning processes (Huang et al., 2019). Our first step of AT identifies properties of a plan
that are prone to failure. These include concepts such as atoms needed throughout a plan but are
only achieved in the initial state. As a second step, we extend goal-reasoning agent expectations to
include anticipatory expectations. A kind of expectation derived from a plan’s relevant states that
identifies exogenous sources that could potentially introduce failures. Finally, we define anticipatory
reasoning to proactively mitigate the potential failures. An agent reasons over the conditions in the
anticipatory expectations, generating anticipatory actions to be executed at specific times, foiling an
exogenous source of failure. To exercise this new capability we use a simple example and define
metrics for evaluating an agent’s anticipatory thinking.
2. Previous Work
Our contributions are based on three related areas of work. Prospective cognition is a fledgling field
in cognitive psychology who’s goal is to understand human ability to reason about and imagine the
future. We discuss some prospection modalities. A second area, goal-reasoning agents, is a type of
agent that adapts to and formulates their own goals in response to their environment. We highlight
some of the overlap between prospection modalities and the agent’s methods for formulating and
achieving goals. Finally, investigations in metacognition’s role in decision making and behavior has
drawn a close tie with autonomy. We detail some of the existing capability to frame anticipatory
thinking’s role.
2.1 Anticipatory Thinking
Anticipatory thinking is an emerging concept in psychology Geden et al. (2018) that captures the
cognitive processes in use when preparing for the future. The deliberate consideration of a diverse
set of possible futures differentiates it from a purely imaginative, divergent, or prospective process
but rather an aggregate of all three. Imagination is a mechanism to reason about what is outside our
immediate sensory inputs. More than an artist’s creative reservoir, imagination drives the creativity
in complex sciences from engineering to finance. Imagination is used to both reason about details in
problem-solving, such as what might have happened in a mystery novel, and as well as generating
novel ideas through methods such as counterfactual reasoning. Calls to the AI community to in-
vestigate imagination machines (Mahadevan, 2018) highlights the gaps between current data-driven
advances in AI and matching human performance in the long term.
Divergent thinking is often used to assess individual differences in creativity and has been part
of scientific studies on creativity since the 1960’s (Guilford, 1967). Assessing divergent thinking
2
asks subjects to perform divergent thinking tasks, the scores and measures of which are still the
focus of numerous studies (Silvia et al., 2008). Physical limitations such as working memory and
recall from long-term memory have been the source of inspiration for developing methodologies to
counteract them (e.g. structured analytic techniques (Heuer, 2008).
Lastly, the emerging field of prospection (the ability to reason about what may happen in the
future) is driven by future-oriented imagination. Szpunar et al. 2014 provide a taxonomy of prospec-
tion that covers four modalities (planning, intention, simulation, prediction) in both syntactic and
semantic spaces. Several AI research communities have investigated the methods that, at least in
name, overlap with the modalities but have lacked the unifying taxonomy to characterize them in
prospective cognition.
2.2 Goal Reasoning
One approach to mitigate risks is to encode mappings from states to goals, such that when an agent
is in a state, it should pursue the corresponding goal. Thus, if risks are known at design time, an
agent can be given mappings from risky states to mitigating goals. MADBot (Coddington et al.,
2005) investigated goal formulation via motivator strategies within, and external to, the planning
process. An example of a motivator function is the following: a rover robot may have the motivator
function that when it’s battery level reaches a threshold, the agent will generate a goal to have a
fully charged battery. This would then be achieved by a plan for the rover to navigate to the power
source and plug itself in. As shown in Coddington (2005) these motivator functions can be either (1)
encoded into the plan operators as constraints (i.e. every action has a precondition that the battery
level is above a threshold) or (2) a separate goal formulation process which runs outside the planner
and generates a new goals when motivator functions trigger.
Other approaches to mitigating risk with planning systems include rationale-based monitors
(Veloso et al., 1998), perceptual-based plan monitors (Dannenhauer & Cox, 2018), and contingency
planning (Hoffmann & Brafman, 2005). Prior work on mitigating risk during plan execution has
considered monitoring rationales for goals (Dannenhauer, 2019). In MADBot and other work on
goal motivator strategies (Muñoz-Avila et al., 2015), goal motivator functions are known at the
design time of the agent. The primary difference of the approach presented here is that goal formu-
lation strategies are identified automatically at runtime by anticipatory thinking approaches using
the plan solution as a source of information.
2.3 Metacognition
Metacognition refers to processes that reason about cognition in some form or another (Cox et al.,
2011). We use the Metacognitive Integrated Dual-Cycle Architecture (MIDCA) to discuss antici-
patory thinking processes. A primary benefit of MIDCA is it’s explicit separation of cognitive and
metacognitive processes. Cognitive processes (see Figure 1) are those that are more directly con-
cerned with the world (goals are world states, plans are sequences of actions that act on world states,
etc). Metacognitive processes (see Figure 2) are those that are more directly concerned with cog-
nitive processes and states (identifying and resolving issues such as impasses that arise in various
cognitive processes). One of the core assumptions here is that the agent’s mental state is sepa-
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rate from the world state (otherwise reasoning about world states would also be reasoning about
cognitive states).
Figure 1. MIDCA cognitive level.
At a general level it seems that AT could be considered a cognitive process since the objective
of AT is to prevent risk that arises from various world states in order to achieve some goal that is
a world state. When considering specific AT processes (presented in the next section) we argue
that AT is truly a metacognitive process since it is concerned with meta goals such as achieved(g’)
where g’ is a cognitive level goal. AT is also concerned with decision making on resource trade-offs
(a type of metareasoning) for risk mitigation (i.e. spending X extra actions to mitigate Y potential
risks). Additionally, if AT processes were to take into account an agent’s likelihood of succeeding
at a task, than AT processes are making use metacognition self-prediction mechanisms.
MIDCA is currently under active development, and until recently most work has consisted of
implementation at the cognitive level. Prior work on the metacognitive level includes monitoring
capabilities that maintain a cognitive trace and control actions capable of switching planning algo-
rithms at runtime (Cox et al., 2017) as well as work on domain independent expectations of cognitive
processes (Dannenhauer et al., 2018). The primary contributions from these works have mostly fo-
cused on the Monitor, Interpret1, and Control phases of the metacognitive layer. The AT process we
describe in this paper proposes additional new methods to the Intrepret, Plan, and Control phases of
the metacognitive level.
1. The Interpret phase generally includes discrepancy detection, explanation/diagnosis, and goal formulation. Of these,
discrepancy detection is the only one with prior work using MIDCA
4
Figure 2. MIDCA metacognitive level.
3. Anticipatory Thinking as Metacognition
Our approach to operationalizing anticipatory thinking begins with the concept as explained from Geden
et al. (2018), "deliberate, divergent exploration and analysis of relevant futures to avoid surprise".
We define three steps that operationalize the (i) deliberate, (ii) divergent, and (iii) relevant compo-
nents of the above AT concept.
First, we identify goal vulnerabilities. This step reasons over a plan’s structure to identify prop-
erties that would be particularly costly were they not to go according to plan. A second step, failure
anticipation, identifies sources of failure for the vulnerabilities. Sources of failure can range from
unknown environment states to other agent’s interfering goals. Finally, a failure mitigation step
modifies an existing plan to reduce the exposure to the sources of failure and creates an anticipatory
expectation. We represent these steps in the process in Table 1 and demonstrate these steps through
an NBeacons running example from Dannenhauer et al. (2018).
Table 1. This method takes as input a plan and returns a modified plan that includes anticipatory actions.
METHOD: Anticipatory Thinking
INPUT: A plan pi
OUTPUT: A modified plan pi′
1 identify goal vulnerabilities in pi
2 identify failure anticipation in pi
3 edit pi with failure mitigations to get pi′
4 return pi′
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In the NBeacons domain, an agent must generate plans to reach beacons and activate them. If
the agent ever passes through a sandpit square, they must take three actions to dig out. The wind
may blow in a known direction at a known speed after every agent action. The wind pushes an agent
a number of squares further (equivalent to the speed) in the wind’s direction and can result in an
agent passing over a sandpit and getting stuck. In our example, the wind is blowing West at a speed
of five making an agent’s plan vulnerable to any sandpit that lies within five squares West of their
location.
We use the Partial Order Causal Link (POCL) representation (Penberthy & Weld, 1992) for an
agent’s plans. The main advantage to using POCL over other plan representations is that causal
link threats can explicitly represents potential failures from external events. We use the typical
definitions for POCL representation from Penberthy & Weld (1992) where a POCL plan consists
of steps (S) that are ground actions from the domain model, bindings (B) that map free variables
to literals, step orderings (O) that constrain when steps must execute relative to one another, and
causal links (L) connect steps to one another when an effect of one step instantiates a precondition
for a following step. While the above plain english definitions of POCL representation will suffice
for those who are familiar with planning, we provide a formal definitions for causal link threats as
they are key to our choice of POCL.
Definition 1 (Causal link threat) A causal link threat occurs when a causal link is established
s
p→ u, and some other step w has effect ¬p and could be executed after s but before u. Executing
w in this interval means the precondition p of u is no longer satisfied by the state after s is executed
and thus u will not execute.
3.1 Goal Vulnerabilities
Identifying a plan’s vulnerable structural properties is the first step in proactively mitigating its
failure. We define a single vulnerability for our NBeacons example, of what could be numerous
vulnerable properties of a plan.
Our first property, precondition strength, is a measure of how many times a precondition is
established and used in plan. The fewer times a precondition is established and the more it is used
increases the vulnerability of a plan to failure.
Definition 2 (Precondition Strength) Precondition strength of a plan, PRESTRENGTH(pi), is a set
of tuples 〈a, p, e〉 where a is a literal, p the number of steps in pi that use it as a precondition, e the
number of times it is an effect before first used as precondition.
Our agent’s existing plan (the orange path in Figure 3 comprises of eight move actions all of
which have the (canMove) precondition. This precondition is only established once in the initial
state and so its entry in PRESTRENGTH(pi) is 〈canMove(agent), 8, 1〉.
3.2 Failure Anticipation
Vulnerabilities are not by themselves indicative that a plan is at risk of failure. Risk of failure re-
quires some means to exploit the vulnerability, what we will call conditioning events. We approach
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Figure 3. An NBeacons example that shows an optimal path in orange along with four conditioning events
that could take place.
identifying these events as a kind of prefactual reasoning (future-oriented counterfactual reason-
ing), where we take the negation of the most vulnerable preconditions (identified in Section 3.1)
and identify actions with them as effects.
Definition 3 (Conditioning Event) The conditioning events of a plan, CE(pi) are actions in the
domain model such that one or more effects of each action is the negation of a precondition of a
step in pi, introducing a causal link threat.
In our NBeacons example, wind serves as a conditioning event. If the wind blows at any point
a sandpit is five squares West (or less) from the agent, a causal link threat is introduced as can-
Move(agent) will not be true and the agent will be forced to spend three actions digging out of the
sand pit. This results in four potential conditioning events, one after each of the agent’s first four
moves, indicated by the red CE notation in Figure 3.
3.3 Failure Mitigation
The final step to operationalizing anticipatory thinking is to define what the relevant property means
for a goal-reasoning agent. We term this step failure mitigation where the agent reasons over con-
ditioning events to identify actions that reduce a plan’s risk exposure to these conditioning events.
These action are anticipatory actions.
7
Definition 4 (Anticipatory Actions) The anticipatory actions of a plan, ANT, is a set of tuples
〈AANT,CE〉 where AANT is an action sequence, ai, a2, ...an added to pi such that at least one effect
reduces the impact of the conditioning events CE in CE(pi).
To mitigate the unpleasantness of being blown about by the wind and getting trapped in a sand-
pit, our agent has the option to outfit itself with a grappling hook. A grappling hook allows an agent
to move out of a sandpit in a single action. However, adding the grappling hook adds action costs
of one for the buy and pack steps that need to be executed. We add these two anticipatory actions to
the agent’s plan before the journey begins, see pi′ in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The original plan (pi) on the top with conditioning events and modified plan (pi′) with two anticipa-
tory actions (blue) on the bottom
Adding the grappling hook to the plan creates an expectation within an agent that risk exposure
to the wind conditioning event has been reduced. We refer to this new type of expectation as an
anticipatory expectation and define it as:
Definition 5 (Anticipatory Expectations) An Anticipatory Expectation is the action cost reduc-
tions expected from introducing anticipatory actions to mitigate conditioning events.
3.4 Anticipatory Thinking in MIDCA
We now put forth an anticipatory thinking approach as a metacognitive process in MIDCA, high-
lighting the role of each phase of the metacognitive layer:
Monitor: Obtain observations of the cognitive level components, including the current plan p and
the current goal g.
Interpret (as composed of the following three steps):
Discrepancy Detection: Flag the current plan p from the cognitive level Plan phase (see
Figure 1, cognitive layer, left side) as potentially risky, risk_level(p, HIGH).
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Explanation / Diagnosis: Assess the risks associated with the plan p using anticipatory think-
ing approaches, such as those described in Section 3.1 using the notions of prestrength.
The results of the analysis would be vulnerabilities V of the plan p.
Goal Formulation: Formulate the goal to transform p into a new plan p′ with a safer risk
level, while maintaining that the current goal of p is achieved. The new goal would then
be {risk_level(p′, LOW) ∧ achieves(p′, g)}.
Evaluate: Drop any meta goals if they have been achieved.
Intend: Commit to achieving the newly formulated meta goal {risk_level(p′, LOW)∧ achieves(p′, g)}.
Plan: Take current mental state containing risk_level(p,HIGH) and vulnerabilities V and search for
a set of new actions, meta_plan mp, consisting of add or delete edits from plan p in order to
achieve p′ such that {risk_level(p′, LOW) ∧ achieves(p′, g)}.
Control: Carry out the sequence of plan edits inmp resulting in a new p′ such that risk_level(p′,LOW)
and p′ |= g where g is the original goal of p.
The primary effort occurs in the Plan phase which we speculate could be modeled as a search
process such that nodes are plans and their associated risk_levels and edges between nodes are
anticipatory actions that are added to (or possibly removed from) the plan. The search process
would terminate when a goal node is reached that meets a low risk_level for the plan inside the
node. This example through the metacognitive phases serves as one possible realization of AT in
MIDCA. We leave more concrete implementation details for future work.
4. Evaluation Framework
Anticipatory thinking is concerned with identifying possible worlds that affect desirable outcomes
and taking action to mitigate them. This differs from typical future-oriented analysis centered
around prediction that are focused on identifying a single likely outcome. As such, to appropri-
ately evaluate anticipatory thinking we require alternative measures than those used in prediction.
4.1 Successful Anticipatory Thinking
Conceptually, anticipatory thinking’s goal is to have a high recall rate. That is, to ensure the future
that unfolds is accounted for in a set of possible futures. However, calculating recall does not capture
the cost of adding anticipatory actions or the cost of identifying conditioning events. To address this
limitation we develop an assessment of anticipatory thinking that accounts for the cost in relation to
the potential benefits.
An additional challenge is to avoid coupling anticipated outcomes to the actual outcomes. AT
mitigates, not predicts, failure. Therefore AT assessment should only assess the potential payoff
from mitigating, not whether any individual future comes to pass.
In Figure 5, we represent anticipatory thinking as a plan’s identified conditioning events in the
green circle. Before anticipatory thinking, conditioning events are unknown to our agent and reside
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Figure 5. Successful anticipatory thinking identifies conditioning events that can be mitigated with antici-
patory actions. In our NBeacons example, before the agent has done any anticipatory thinking, the wind
conditioning events are unidentified and are in the blue area. After the the goal vulnerability and failure
anticipation steps (Sections 3.1, 3.2), wind conditioning events are now in the green area. Once anticipa-
tory actions have been added to the plan (Section 3.3), the wind conditioning events are mitigated and in the
yellow area.
in the blue area. Successful anticipatory thinking is the set of identified conditioning events where
anticipatory actions are taken to mitigate their impact and reside in the yellow area. We assess
successful anticipatory thinking as
AT assess(pi) =
|CE(ANT )|
|CE| ×
1− |A
ANT(ANTi)|
|ANT|∑
i
(|CE(ANTi)|∑
j
impact(cej)
)
 , (1)
where |CE| is the number of conditioning events identified and |CE(ANT )| are the mitigated con-
ditioning events. Their ratio represents how many conditioning events were mitigated. A second
ratio calculates the potential benefit of mitigation. For each anticipatory action set, ANT, we sum
the impact of each conditioning event mitigated, impact(cej), and subtract the cost of the anticipa-
tory actions, AA(ANTi).
4.2 Example
Applying equation 1 to our NBeacons conditioning events, we have four wind conditioning events,
|CE| = 4, and each one is mitigated, |CE(ANT )| = 4. This ratio of 1.0 (4/4) is best possible case
in that every identified conditioning event was mitigated. Conversely, plans where many identified
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conditioning events that have few mitigations would have a ratio closer to zero and may benefit
from the use of robust search algorithms. Our next ratio assesses the potential mitigation benefit.
Mitigating the wind event requires buying and packing the grappling hook, each with an action
cost of one for a total of two, |AA(ANTi)| = 2. The sole anticipatory action sequence, i = 1, is
expected to save the agent three dig actions for each of the four wind events, j = 4, resulting in a
potential mitigation of twelve actions, and a resulting mitigation ratio of 0.83 (1 − 0.17). Again,
plans with not so favorable benefits from mitigations would have a lower expected payoff from their
actions and would have a ratio closer to zero. Together these two ratios result in an AT assess(pi′) of
0.83 (1.0×−0.83), this calculation is reflected in Equation 2.
AT assess(pi′) =
4
4
×
1− 21∑
i
(3 + 3 + 3 + 3)
 , (2)
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Anticipatory thinking is a complex cognitive process for assessing and managing risk in many con-
texts. It allows humans to identify potential future issues and proactively take actions in the present
that will manage their risks. We have defined how an artificial agent may perform anticipatory think-
ing at a goal reasoning level, so they may receive the same benefits and enable further autonomous
capability.
Our approach made three contributions. First we defined anticipatory thinking in the MIDCA
cognitive architecture as a goal reasoning process at the metacognitive layer. Specifically, Section
3.4 highlights the role of AT in each phase of the metacognitive layer of MIDCA shown in Figure 2.
Second, we operationalized the anticipatory thinking concept as a three step process for managing
risk in plans. Goal vulnerabilities, failure anticipations and failure mitigation identify weakness
of a plan, their potential failure sources (conditioning events), and failure mitigations (anticipatory
actions) to reduce the impact of the failure sources. Finally, we proposed a numeric assessment for
successful anticipatory thinking. Key to the assessment are a ratio of identified conditioning events
to mitigated ones and an expected cost-benefit ratio for the anticipatory actions.
We expect two immediate areas of future work. First, we are planning to integrate our anticipa-
tory thinking definitions into an existing MIDCA implementation. From there, we will be able to
perform experiments on existing domains. A second area is to develop more methodologies for each
of the three anticipatory thinking steps. Expanding the failure sources beyond the failure inducing
step (e.g. an action sequence) to identify the most parsimonious mitigation and extracting some
benefit from unmitigated conditioning events are promising avenues of investigation.
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